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Summary: Like many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana is experiencing the impact of the 
global crisis and the uncertain economic outlook. Indeed, as Ghana’s economy is among the most 
open in Africa, it is expected that the country has been and will continue to be severely affected by the 
crisis,  although  strong  export  prices  of  its  main  exports  (gold  and  cocoa)  may  at  least  partially 
counteract the effects associated with the crisis. 
The main goal of this paper is to understand the potential impacts of the 2008/9 global crisis on 
different dimensions of child poverty (monetary, hunger, school participation, child labour and access 
to health services) in Ghana and to support the policy-maker in designing the most appropriate policy 
response to counteract the negative effects of the crisis. As timely data are not available, a combined 
macro-micro economic model to predict the impact of the global crisis on children was developed. 
Simulations suggest that the financial crisis would increase monetary poverty and hunger across all 
regions of Ghana, eroding many of the gains made over the past few years. Indeed, in comparison 
with the year preceding the crisis, instead of a reduction of four percentage points in child monetary 
poverty in 2011 predicted in the absence of crisis, the simulations indicate a 6.6 percentage point 
increase, with a continuous increasing pattern over the period of study. The global crisis is also 
predicted  to  severely  deepen  hunger  among  children,  which  is  simulated  to  increase  up  to  6.6 
percentage points in 2011 beginning with a sharp increase already in 2009. For both monetary poverty 
and hunger, the impact of the crisis differs across all regions, with the Eastern, Volta and Greater 
Accra regions predicted to be the most affected. Children’s participation in schooling and labour, as 
well as their access to health services, are forecast to be much less affected by the crisis, although it is 
found to reverse predicted increases in enrolment and health access (with substitution toward more 
modern types of health services) and forecasted reductions in child labour. 
Finally, alternative policy options have been simulated: a cash transfer programme targeted to poor 
children is found to be generally more effective in protecting children than food subsidies. Indeed, 
with a total budget equivalent to 1% of 2008 GDP, a cash transfer – equivalent to an individual annual 
amount of 19.8 Cedis – would cut the predicted increase in monetary poverty by over two percentage 
points in 2011. 
Although Ghana might be in a position to rapidly implement a cash transfer programme building on 
the existing Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty (LEAP) programme, other interventions (or 
mix  of  policies)  might  be  more  cost-effective  in the  short  run.  A  combination  of  a  universal  or 
regionally targeted cash transfer programmes for children aged 0 to 5 years old, together with a 
school-feeding programme in poorer regions, might represent an effective way to intervene quickly to 
improve child well-being. 
Key Words: global economic crisis, child poverty, hunger, education, child labour, health, West and 
Central Africa, Ghana, social protection 
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A UNICEF-PEP Africa Research Project on  
the Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Children in Western and Central Africa  
This study assesses the potential effects of the global economic crisis on children in Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon and Ghana and the proposal of concrete policy responses to the policy makers. It is the 
result of a research project promoted by the Regional Office of UNICEF for West and Central Africa 
and  led  by  the  African  office  of  the  Poverty  and  Economic  Policy  (PEP)  research  network,  in 
collaboration with the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre and the UNICEF Division of Policy and 
Practice.  PEP  is  financed  by  the  Government  of  Canada  through  the  International  Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and by the 
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). PEP’s African office (PEP-Africa) is 
based at the Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale (CRES, Dakar). 
A regional and three country teams of researchers were formed. The regional team, coordinated by 
PEP-Africa,  was  composed  of  researchers  from  Africa  (GREAT,  Mali;  University  of  Yaoundé, 
Cameroon), from the Université Laval in Canada and the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre. The 
regional team developed the basic methodology, provided training and closely supervised the three 
country studies, and prepared a regional report and policy brief synthesizing the results for the three 
countries. The country teams led the country analyses, interacted with the local policy committees and 
wrote their respective country reports. 
This research was initiated in June 2009: at the end of that month the regional team provided the 
methodology and held in Accra an intensive training workshop for the local teams. A visit to each 
country followed in August. In the following months the regional and country teams carried out the 
analyses  and  presented  the  preliminary  results  of  the  study  in  November  and  December  at  the 
WCARO Social Policy Network Meeting in Dakar, the ODI-UNICEF conference on “The global 
economic crisis – Including children in the policy response” in London and the AERC conference on 
“Rethinking  African  Economic  Policy  in  Light  of the  Global  Economic  and Financial  Crisis”  in 
Nairobi. In the following two months the regional and country studies were finalized by including 
also some additional policy responses ad hoc to each country. 
The main outcomes of this project are: 
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The direct impact of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, through 
reduced foreign trade and capital inflows, has been well recognized and discussed by many 
development experts. The crisis has to some extent eroded many of the macroeconomic gains 
made by most sub-Saharan African countries. Specifically, the economy-wide effects range 
from declining investment in public services to diminished access to credit, and from growing 
employment  imbalances  and  diminished  consumption  capacities  to  potentially  heightened 
social exclusion. Furthermore, reductions in fiscal resources and aid available to governments 
have affected public service delivery, not just in education, health, sanitation and water, but 
also in areas such as social protection.  
 
In terms of labour supply, evidence from past crises in poor countries suggests that the global 
crisis is likely to disproportionately and negatively affect employment, frequently leading to 
longer  working  hours  and  a  move  into  riskier  and  lower  status  forms  of  employment  or 
informal  jobs,  as  well  as  an  increased  involvement  of  children  in  work  related  activities 
(Woldehanna et al. 2008). There is ample evidence of this from the crises in Thailand and 
South Korea in the late 1990s (Shin 1999; Kim and Voos 2007; United Nations 2003). 
 
This  research  aims  at  shedding  some  light  on  the  potential  impact  of  the  current  global 
economic  crisis  on  child  well-being  and  proposing  alternative  policy  options  to  the 
government  to  protect  the  development  of  children  and  to  intervene  before  the  potential 
detrimental effects brought by the crisis become long-lasting. As complete data are not yet 
available on these impacts, we propose an ex-ante layered macro-micro simulation approach. 
Specifically, at the macro level we simulate through a CGE model the impact of the crisis 
through predicted changes in foreign direct investments, trade, remittances and international 
aid. Changes in incomes and prices generated by the CGE model are then integrated into a 
micro-behavioural simulation model and, finally, results generated from the latter are used to 
estimate variations in the various dimensions of child poverty. In particular, the effects on 
child monetary poverty, hunger, child school and labour participation, and access to health 
care are simulated. 
 
The rest of the report is presented in four sections. Following this introduction, section two 
provides the context for the study; section three discusses the analytical framework, whilst 
section  four  presents  the  results  of  the  simulated  scenarios.  Finally,  the  last  section 
summarizes the main findings and the implications of the research. 
1.  CONTEXT 
Like many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana is experiencing the impact of the global 
crisis and the uncertain economic outlook. As Ghana’s economy is among the most open in 
Africa, it is expected that it will be severely affected by the crisis, although strong export 
prices of its main exports (gold and cocoa) may at least partially counteract the effects of the 
crisis. Private remittances are falling, foreign direct investment appears to be lower with few 
near term prospects for new state divestitures, and official access to global market financing 
has suffered a set-back.   
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These developments have had a direct impact on the balance of payments, domestic demand, 
and economic growth. At the same time, currency pressures have triggered higher inflation, 
requiring tighter monetary policy, with further adverse impact on economic activity. 
 
The degree of economic slowdown in 2009 remains uncertain, as quarterly GDP data were 
not  compiled  in  Ghana  at  the  time  this  document  was  drafted.  The  Bank  of  Ghana’s 
Composite Index of Economic Activity (CIEA) at the end of May 2009 declined by 2.2% 
compared to a year earlier in real terms, suggesting real GDP growth below the 5% mark, 
down from the peak of 7.3% in 2008. Similarly, the Bank of Ghana’s survey of business and 
consumer confidence in June 2009 reported a decline in optimism compared to the April 
2009 survey. 
 
The crisis is having a clear impact on government revenue, with domestic VAT collections 
falling 27% below target levels in the first half of 2009 and corporate income taxes 17% 
below  target,  on  the  same  basis.  At  the  same  time,  financing  for  the  budget  has  been 
adversely impacted. No financing from sovereign market access and divestitures to foreign 
investors is projected for 2009-2010, compared to financing in the 4-6% of GDP range during 
2007-2008. 
 
In the balance of payments, lower remittances and a decline in capital inflows contributed to 
a  sharp  decline  in  foreign  reserve  coverage  in  late  2008  and  the  first  half  of  2009. 
Notwithstanding this support for the balance of payments, the Ghana national currency (cedi) 
depreciated significantly through late 2008 and into 2009, with a pass through to domestic 
inflation. Accordingly, the 12-month inflation rate rose from the 10% range a year earlier to 
close to 20% through the first half of 2009. A significant contribution to this trend came from 
imported goods and services, including a 30% rise in petroleum product prices. 
 
The effects of the financial and economic crisis remain uncertain. Indeed, the prospects of a 
further slowdown in global demand, stagnation or even a decline in remittance flows are 
likely to diminish the prospects of growth in 2009 below expectations. The magnitude and 
spill over of the global slowdown emanating from the global crisis may be more pronounced 
than expected. The global outlook is uncertain and financial strains persist. A general lack of 
confidence  in  the  economy  may  lead  to  a  deeper  recession,  curtail  trade  finance,  and 
constrain global trade. Downward pressure on economic activities could worsen especially 
with Ghana’s trade partners where there are very  close trade and financial linkages. The 
short-term poverty impact of the current crisis will be compounded if domestic prices for fuel 
and food remain relatively high. In Ghana, fiscal space for cushioning the impact on the poor 
is minimal, transfer mechanisms are not well targeted, and putting new transfer systems in 
place takes time, money and administrative capacity. 
 
Due to fiscal slippages during 2008, when the deficit rose to exceed 14% of GDP and public 
debt  rose  sharply,  Ghana  does  not  have  the  fiscal  space  to  adopt  counter-cyclical  fiscal 
policies  to  cushion  its  citizens  against  the  global  crisis.  Indeed,  the  planned  fiscal 
consolidation in 2009 and later years is being compounded by the fall in budget access to 
market financing and divestiture funding.   
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Moreover, reflecting balance of payment pressures and rising inflation, monetary policy has 
been  tightened  in  Ghana  since  the  start  of  the  global  crisis,  in  contrast  to  the  easing  of 
monetary policy in most sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
Existing social protection includes the “lifeline” scheme to reduce utility costs at low-usage 
levels,  the  Livelihood  Empowerment  Against  Poverty  (LEAP)  targeted  cash  transfer 
programme, and a school feeding programme. Other policies include grants and subsidies for 
education (capitation grants, subsidy for basic education certificate examination, a subsidy 
for senior high schools), and national youth employment programmes. However, financing to 
expand  current  poverty-reducing  programmes  and  social  protection  schemes  for  the  most 
vulnerable households will prove critical. 
 
In  response  to  the  global  crisis,  the  Government  of  Ghana  has  initiated  various  strategic 
interventions to extend the social protection net and measures are being adopted in areas that 
appear particularly at risk. For example, the government has made a provision of GHC30 
million in the 2009 budget for the provision of potable water. This intervention is to help 
reduce the incidence of water-borne diseases as well as the eradication of the guinea worm 
pandemic  in  the  rural  and  affected  communities.  Equally,  the  government  would  like  to 
extend financial support to the pro-poor households under the LEAP programme from 18,000 
households currently to 35,000 households. 
 
As much as the government wants to mitigate the risks associated with slower growth for low 
income and vulnerable groups, the fiscal ability to provide social protection and safety nets is 
constrained  by  the  need  to  restore  fiscal  discipline  in  order  to  minimize  the  risks  of 
macroeconomic  instabilities.  The  Government  therefore  is  having  difficulty  strengthening 
existing programmes. Accordingly, the budget provision for potable water is insufficient to 
meet the growing demand from the communities affected by the guinea worm pandemic, and 
the  intended  scaling  up  of  the  LEAP  programme  may  not  be  feasible,  given  financing 
constraints. 
 
Reflecting  the  growth  slowdown  in  2009  discussed  above,  revenue  performance  has 
deteriorated. Although currency depreciation is providing temporary support to import tax 
collections, domestic revenues are experiencing large shortfalls. For the first half of 2009, 
shortfalls have been particularly important for domestic VAT, the national health insurance 
levy  (NHIL)  and  corporate  taxes.  Unless  performance  in  these  and  other  domestic  taxes 
strengthens in the second half, the overall shortfall in domestic revenues on account of the 
global economic crisis could be as large as 1.8% of GDP (Table 1).  
 
Faced with these potential revenue shortfalls, the government has adopted a number of new 
revenue measures that should support collections in 2009. These include a stabilization levy 
(new 5% corporate income tax), an increase in the airport departure tax, cutbacks in tax 
exemptions, and new fees and licenses. The projected yield of these measures is estimated at 
0.6% of GDP. 
Ghana’s foreign reserves at end-June 2008 were $2.6 billion, or 2.8 months of projected 
imports of goods and services, declining to $2.0 billion at end 2008 (2.2 months of import 
coverage).   
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By  end-March  2009,  reserves  had  fallen  further  to  $1.75  billion  (1.7  months  of  import 
coverage). The decline in foreign reserve coverage in late 2008 and early 2009 was directly 
linked to the global financial crisis. In particular, the balance of payments deteriorated on 
account of the factors described below. 
Table 1: Revenue developments in the first half of 2009 
Revenue Type  Budget projection 
for 2009 (GHc 
million) 
Deviation from 






Domestic VAT  577  -26.8  -155 
Domestic excises  63  -1.6  -1 
Domestic NHIL  392  -26.8  -105 
Communications services tax  60  -9.5  -6 
Personal income tax  663  1.4  9 
Corporate income tax  688  -17.5  -120 
Total of above  2443    -378 
per cent of GDP  -11.3     -1.8 
Source: MOFEP 
 
Remittance inflows appear to have been affected by the  crisis.  Individual foreign inward 
transfers  have  fallen  sharply  since  January  2009  perhaps  due  to  the  fact  that  Ghanaian 
workers  abroad  are  losing  their  jobs  or  accepting  lower  wages  because  of  the  global 
economic downturn. Net inward private transfers fell from 507.63 million US$ in the first 
quarter of 2008 to 397.08 million US$ the first quarter of 2009. 
 
Data compiled by the Ghana Investment Promotion Council on foreign direct investments 
shows that inward investments in the first quarter of 2009 was only one-third of the level of a 
year earlier (Table 2). 
Table 2: Value of foreign direct investments, 2008-2009 (million US $) 
  Q1 2008  Q1 2009 
Joint Ghanaian-Foreign projects  3.0   5.4  
Wholly-owned foreign enterprises  46.1   12.7  
Source: Ghana Investment Promotion Council 
 
In the  area of portfolio investments, Ghana benefited in 2007  and  early 2008  from non-
resident  investments  in  the  domestic  treasury  bill  market.  As  risk  aversion  increased 
following the global financial crisis, these investments were partly liquidated in late-2008 and 
early-2009. Ghana issued a debut Eurobond in late-2007 and was considering further market 
placements in late-2008. These were cancelled when Ghana’s market access was effectively 
closed as a result of the  global crisis. With regard to privatization proceeds, the country 
experienced inward capital investments associated with divestitures in both 2007 and 2008. 
Given the increased risk aversion after the global financial crisis, further such revenues are 
not a near-term prospect.  
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Table 3: Balance of payments, 2007-2009 
In millions of dollars  2007  2008  2009 
Crisis-affected BOP components 
   Private transfers 
   Official capital flows (1) 
   Private capital flows (including errors/omission) 
Other BOP components  
   Trade balance 
   Services and income flows 
   Official transfers 
   Oil sector investments 
Overall balance 
Gross foreign reserves (2) 





































Source: MOFEP and IMF projections for PRGF arrangement. 
Notes: 1) Before exceptional financing from World Bank and bilateral sources; 2) Gross reserves in 2009 are 
measured before exceptional financing from IMF, World Bank and bilateral creditors.  
 
The private remittance and capital flows in table 3 are projected at $2.2 billion in 2009, down 
from more than $4 billion in the preceding two years. This shortfall more than accounts for 
the projected deficit in the balance of payments in 2009 and for the continuing decline in 
foreign reserves. Without any exceptional financing in 2009, gross reserves would decline to 
a  projected  $1.5 billion  (1.5  months  of  import  cover).  With  $450  million  of  exceptional 
financing from the World Bank, IMF, and other bilateral creditors, foreign reserves would be 
stabilized in 2009 at a projected $1.95 billion (1.5 months of import cover). 
2.  METHODOLOGY  
The  study  adopts  the  layered  macro-micro  methodology  developed  by  Bibi,  Cockburn, 
Fofana, and Tiberti (2010). In this section we summarize the methodology and elaborate on 
some specific issues in the case of Ghana. Evidently, the global economic crisis at the macro 
level will affect world commodity prices, foreign aid, FDI and remittances, which will affect 
local  product  and  factor  markets,  government  finances  and  international  trade  in  diverse 
ways. Fluctuations in these variables ultimately determine changes in household incomes, 
through  changes  in  incomes  and  consumer  prices,  which  consequently  affect  various 
dimensions of child well-being. 
 
At the macro level, simulations are run with a CGE model, which is a multi-market model of 
an  economy  based  on  real  world  data  and  which  uses  rigorous  microeconomic  and 
macroeconomic  equations  to  simulate  the  behavior  of  economic  agents.  We  begin  by 
improving the 2005 SAM constructed by the Ghana Statistical Service. First the SAM is 
updated to 2008 macroeconomic figures. Also, the shares of labour categories were further 
disaggregated using information from the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS 5) into six 
categories as shown in table 4. This SAM was used to run the CGE model. The GLSS 5 is a 
nationally representative household survey that integrates socio-demographic and economic 
information on households and individuals, including children. Information on prices of the 
commodity bundles was obtained from the price data base of the Ghana Statistical Service 
and other international sources.  
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Table 4: Structure of aggregate 2008 SAM  
27 Sectors and Commodities 
 
·  12 agricultural categories 
·  3 industries 
·  12 services 
7 Factors of Production 
 
·  1 capital 
·  6 labour categories (rural formal labour, urban formal skilled 
labour, urban formal unskilled labour, rural informal labour, 
urban informal skilled labour, urban informal unskilled 
labour) 
2 Households  ·  1 rural 
·  1 urban 
 
After the macro and the micro models are made consistent and changes in prices, revenues 
and employment rates generated by the macro simulations are fed into the micro model, we 
are able to estimate the potential effect of the crisis and alternative policy options on child 
welfare. 
 
Changes in child monetary poverty under the different scenarios simulated in this analysis are 
captured through a Cobb-Douglas approach, using household specific preferences but with 
fixed budget shares. Aggregate household consumption, deflated by a per adult equivalent 
scale based on minimum caloric needs and by relevant spatial and temporal deflators, is the 
variable used to assess changes in monetary poverty, according to the Ghana absolute poverty 
line (37.089 in new Cedis). Changes in real consumption are affected by two main channels: 
income and  consumer prices. Changes in household income are the result of the sum of 
changes in incomes from: wages (affected by variations in both wage and employment rates); 
self-employment  in  agriculture  and  non  agriculture  sectors;  transfers  (public  and  private 
transfers  and  dividends).  Changes  in  consumer  prices  affect  real  consumption  through 
household purchasing power. 
 
Per adult equivalent food quantities consumed in the base year and those simulated under the 
different scenarios for each consumption category are used to estimate changes in hunger 
rates.  With  the  help  of  Ghana-specific  nutritional  tables  (Eyeson  and  Ankrah  1975),  we 
translated  the  food  quantities  consumed  into  calories,  calculated  the  hunger  rate  by 
comparing the per adult equivalent calorie intake with the daily caloric requirement, which is 
assumed to be equal to 2450 kcal. Calorie intakes are affected across the different scenarios 
by changes in household income (which are obtained as described above), and by changes in 
food prices, as these modify the quantities of food consumed. Unfortunately, GLSS5 does not 
contain  information  on  consumer  prices,  which  provide  the  best  price  data  for  such  an 
analysis.  We  were  thus  obliged  to  use  official  consumer  price  data  by  region,  further 
disaggregated into urban and rural areas, which might result in an overestimation of the child 
hunger rate to the extent that households pay lower prices or consume lower quality goods. 
However, as we are primarily interested to see how the crisis and policy responses to it can 
potentially affect the calorie intake, the quality of data is likely to affect less the absolute 
levels than subsequent variations in absolute levels.
1 
 
                                                 
1 See Cockburn, Fofana and Tiberti (2010) for a detailed discussion on this issue and the appropriateness of 
using calorie intake to estimate the hunger rate.  
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For both monetary poverty and hunger, we will show the estimated headcount and poverty 
gaps for the child population (younger than 15 years old) in the base year as well as those 
simulated under the different scenarios. In addition to the national rates, we will show results 
by different break-downs to capture within country differences, namely by region, locality 
(urban/rural), number of children living in the household, and gender of the household head. 
 
To investigate the effects, in each simulation scenario, of changes in real consumption on the 
probability that a child goes to school and/or to work,
2 we identified four situations: i) school-
no  work;  ii)  school-work;  iii)  no  school-work;  iv)  no  school-no  work.  We  employed  a 
bivariate probit regression estimating the joint probability of a child attending school and 
working  on  individual/household/community  characteristics  and  real  adult  equivalent 
consumption. We then compared the predicted average probability of children being in each 
of the four situations in the base year and in each subsequent year according to the different 
scenarios: absence of the crisis, crisis and different policy responses. 
 
Lastly, to investigate the change in real consumption on the probability of ill children asking 
for a health consultation, we ran a logit model with a binary dependent variable taking value 
1  if  a  sick  child  had  a  health  consultation  and  0  otherwise.  Individual,  household  and 
community  characteristics,  as  well  as  real  adult  equivalent  consumption,  were  the 
explanatory variables. In order to ascertain if there is substitution towards a different type of 
health  facility  as  a  result  of  the  crisis,  among  those  who  had  a  consultation  we  ran  a 
multinomial-logit  model  with  a  dependent  variable  taking  value  1  if  the  child  visited  a 
hospital, 2 if s/he visited a clinic, 3 if s/he visited a pharmacy or chemical store and 4 if other 
health  facilities  were  consulted:  traditional  healers,  consultants  or  patient’s  home.  Again, 
individual,  household  and  community  characteristics  and  the  real  adult  equivalent 
consumption were the explanatory variables. 
 
We then used this model to predict the probabilities of ill children accessing a health facility 
(logit regression) and the choice of health care facility (multinomial logit regression) for each 
simulation scenario. We then calculated the average percentage change between the predicted 
probabilities in the base year and the predicted probabilities under the different scenarios. 
 
Then, one of the simulated policies (targeted cash transfers to poor children) required us to 
develop a tool helping the identification of poor children, as government would be required to 
in implementing such a programme. To do this, we needed to construct a micro-econometric 
model that, based on easily observable individual, household and community characteristics, 
was able to correctly predict household consumption and, therefore, the poverty status of 
each  child.  A  proxy-means  approach  was  used  and,  specifically,  followed  a  quantile 
regression. For more details on the model see Bibi, Cockburn, Fofana and Tiberti (2010). 
Table A in Annex II lists the variables used in the model and their estimated coefficients in 
predicting (the log of) real household income per adult equivalent. 
                                                 
2 A child is defined as involved in a work activity if s/he did any domestic work for at least 28 hours in a week 
and/or any economic activity (irrespective of the hours spent on it) if the child is less than 12 years old, and 
more than 14 hours a week if 12 and older. This is the definition of child labour adopted for the elaboration of 
MICS  data  as  reported  by  www.childinfo.org;  for  further  information  see  the  child  protection  sub-section 
included there.  
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Finally, the data for the micro analysis come from the Ghana Living Standard Survey, carried 
out in 2005/06. The “base year” of our analysis thus corresponds to 2005/06, and we made 
the  hypothesis  –  strong  but  necessary  in  the  absence  of  reliable  data  –  that  both  the 
distribution and the level of consumption and revenues did not change between the year of 
the survey and the base year (i.e. the year preceding the crisis) of our analysis. 
3.  SIMULATION SCENARIOS AND RESULTS 
The  study  first  simulates  two  sets  of  scenarios:  the  business  as  usual  (BaU)  or  baseline 
scenario (without crisis), and the crisis scenario. The BaU scenario is based on the hypothesis 
that changes in variables linking Ghana’s economy to the global ecoonomy follow historical 
(pre-crisis) trends. The crisis scenario, based on recent information (observed or projected) on 
the situation of the  global economy,  assumes  a decline in the variables that transmit the 
global  crisis  to  the  local  economy  (import  prices,  export  volumes,  remittances,  FDI  and 
foreign aid; hereafter “transmission variables”) in 2009,
3 then their stagnation in 2010 except 
for  commodity  prices  that  rebound  and,  finally,  a  recovery  in  2011  as  all  transmission 
variables resume historical trends, albeit from a lower base than in the BaU, in 2011. These 
scenarios are discussed in detail in Cockburn, Fofana and Tiberti (2010). Government per 
capita  expenditures  are  assumed  to  remain  constant  and  the  increase  in  the  government 
deficit, induced by the fall in tax revenues and foreign aid inflows, is assumed to be covered 
through increased domestic borrowing. 
 
Without  the  crisis  (BaU),  all  transmission  variables  show  increasing  trends  (table  1). 
However,  the  world  prices  of  imports,  after  reaching  historical  records  in  2007-8,  are 
assumed  to  stagnate  on  average  over  the  following  three  years.  Changes  in  transmission 
variables stemming from the global economy downturn are also presented in table 5. The 
global crisis translates into absolute declines in the growth rates of the transmission variables 
in  2009  except  for  export  volumes.  However,  the  latter  is  also  affected  by  the  global 
economic  downturn,  as  export  volumes  do  not  grow  in  the  crisis  as  fast  as  in  the  BaU 
scenarios. In 2010, import prices start to increase by 10% on average, while other variables – 
export  volumes,  foreign  investment,  remittances,  and  foreign  aid  –  stagnate.  The  latter 
variables recover in 2011 following their historical trends. 
Table 5: Percentage change in transmission variables 
  BaU  Crisis 
2009  2010  2011  2009  2010  2011 
Average world import price  0.0  0.0  0.0  -19.2  10.1  10.2 
Export volumes  12.3  12.0  11.4  5.0  0.0  11.4 
Foreign investment  11.0  9.9  9.0  -42.0  0.0  9.0 
International aid  2.7  2.7  2.6  -14.0  0.0  2.6 
Remittances  7.0  6.4  5.8  -11.6  0.0  5.8 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on simulations 
 
                                                 
3 Years refer to the period ending in June. For example, “2009” refers to the period July 2008-June 2009.  
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4.1 Macro impacts 
According to the simulations, without the global crisis Ghana would have maintained its real 
GDP growth rates at 7% over the period 2009-2011 (figure 1). With the crisis, the real GDP 
growth rates fall to 5.1 and 3.8% in 2009 and 2010, respectively, then increase to 6.5% in 
2011, just below the BaU rate. 
 
The GDP growth rate slows down in 2009 because of a significant decline in investment and, 
to  a  lesser  extent,  in  final  consumption  (table  6).  The  deterioration  of  the  latter  in  2010 
contributes to exacerbate the growth slowdown. Investment and final consumption recover in 
2011 and contribute to the GDP growth during this period.      
Figure 1: Simulated real GDP growth rates (per cent), annual change 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on simulations 
 
Table 6 records annual changes in the components of GDP: final consumption, investment, 
and net exports. Under the BaU scenario these components grow strongly over the period 
2009-2011. The economy under the crisis scenario shows much reduced growth rates for 
these  variables,  in  particular  investment  and  final  consumption.  Average  growth  rates  of 
investment  decline  by  8.6%,  compared  to  an  increase  of  13%  under  the  BaU  in  2009. 
Although the fall in investment growth rate lowers in 2010, the rebound in the global import 
prices contributes to deteriorate the purchasing power and reduces the final consumption. 
Table 6: Simulated change in components of GDP (per cent) 
  Final consumption  Investment  Export  Import  Net export 
Ratio to GDP  103.2  35.0  40.1  -77.0  -36.9 
BaU (Annual change) 
   2009  7.5  13.1  12.3  13.1  13.9 
   2010  11.5  16.8  12.0  19.6  27.6 
   2011  13.8  17.5  11.4  21.7  31.3 
Crisis (Annual change) 
   2009  0.4  -8.6  5.0  -7.2  -20.4 
   2010  -2.8  -1.7  0.0  -10.1  -24.5 
   2011  4.2  8.2  11.4  6.5  -2.8 






On the other hand, the fall in import prices reduces the country’s trade deficit (negative net 
exports), in particular during the first and second years of the crisis.  
The  importance  of  foreign  investment  in  the  country  (figure  2)  renders  it  particularly 
vulnerable to its reduction during the crisis. However, Ghana's greater exposure to external 
trade, associated with favorable terms of trade development and the continuing strong export 
prices for its two main exports (gold and cocoa), has contributed to substantially reduce its 
trade deficit and mitigate the adverse effects of the global crisis. 
Figure 2: Structure of savings in 2008, percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on simulations 
 
The decline in domestic prices simulated under the no-crisis scenario reverses in the crisis 
scenario.  Without  the  crisis,  consumer  and  value  added  (or  factor)  prices  would  have 
continued to decrease  and increase,  respectively, over the period of 2009-2011 (table 7). 
However,  under  the  global  crisis  scenario,  consumer  prices  increase  because  of  the 
depreciation of the national currency, while value added prices fall because of higher input 
costs.  The  decline  in  external  resources  inflows  –  export  revenues,  remittances,  foreign 
investment and aid flows – and the lesser reduction in import cost contribute to depreciate the 
exchange  rate.  This  effect  accentuates  during  the  stabilization  period  (2010)  with  the 
expected rebound of world import prices. This contributes to lower final consumption and, 
consequently,  to  enhance  the  adverse  effects  of  the  global  crisis  during  the  stabilization 
period.         
Table 7: Simulated annual changes in price indices (per cent) 
  BaU    Crisis 
  Exchange rate  Consumer  Value added    Exchange rate  Consumer  Value added 
2009  -6.0  -2.3  4.2    27.6  4.2  0.8 
2010  -9.3  -3.8  5.5    3.0  5.8  -5.3 
2011  -11.0  -3.9  6.3    -8.4  0.6  0.7 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on simulations 
 
Referring to figure 3, in the BaU scenario the Government primary budget balance remains in 
surplus and increases throughout 2009-2011. When the crisis scenario is simulated, it is in 
deficit over the crisis and the stabilization periods of 2009 and 2010 and returns to a surplus 
when the recovery of the pre-crisis growth pace comes in the 2011.  
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Figure 3: Simulated Government primary budget surplus (per cent of GDP) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on simulations 
 
In the absence of global crisis, Ghana’s strong economic growth would have increased the 
demand for both formal and informal work, resulting in an increase in the informal wage rate 
(table 8). Formal wage rates are fixed in real terms according to the short run perspective of 
the analysis. The crisis results in a lower growth rate for formal employment compared to the 
BaU scenario in 2009. More unemployed workers in the formal sectors increase the pressure 
in the informal labour market, which is translated into lower wages as compared to the BaU. 
The situation worsens in 2010 (stabilization period) when formal employment falls. More 
workers are pushed into the informal labour market and consequently the informal wage rate 
decreases. The last period 2011 shows a recovery in the labour market when formal and 
informal employment rebound, along with the informal wage rate (table 8).  
Table 8: Simulated annual changes in wage rates and employment levels (per cent) 
 
     Formal work          Informal work        Informal wage 
BaU  Crisis    BaU  Crisis    BaU  Crisis 
2009  3.1  2.0    2.2  3.0    10.8  6.7 
2010  4.1  -0.6    1.5  4.9    13.4  -3.8 
2011  4.1  1.8    1.5  3.2    15.0  5.9 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on simulations 
4.2 Impacts on children
4 
4.2.1 Monetary poverty under the baseline and crisis scenarios 
Tables 9 and 10 present results for child monetary poverty in the base year and under the 
simulated scenarios in absence of crisis (BaU) and with the crisis for the 3-year period 2009-
2011.  Estimates  for  the  base  year  indicate  that  the  national  monetary  headcount  poverty 
among children in Ghana was 33.7% (table 8), representing slightly more than 3.1 million 
children. However, there are large regional disparities in the incidence of poverty: the Eastern 
region shows the lowest child poverty (15.8%), followed by the Ashanti and Central regions, 
while the three northern regions have the highest child poverty rates ranging between 56.7% 
in Northern and 77.9% in Upper East, well above the national average.  
                                                 
4 If the reader is interested in the absolute numbers of children affected in the scenarios presented in this study 
(further to those already reported in the main text), then s/he can consult the percentages shown and discussed 
hereafter in the main text together with the relevant absolute numbers reported in table D in Annex II.  
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Significant differences also exist between urban and rural areas, with the latter showing a 
child poverty rate almost double that estimated for urban areas. Child poverty among children 
living  in  male-headed  households  is  higher  (36.1%)  compared  with  female-headed 
households (25.9%). Also, child poverty is positively correlated with the number of children 
living in the household; while children without any siblings show a poverty rate of 14.7%, 
those living in households with 6 or more children face a dramatically higher risk of being 
poor (65.5%).  
Table 9: Monetary headcount poverty in base year, BaU and crisis scenarios by region, 
sex, locality and number of children in the household 




BaU    Crisis  
2009  2010  2011    2009  2010  2011 
All Children  100  33.7  -0.9  -1.9  -4.1    1.5  6.1  6.6 
Western  10.6  40.5  -1.4  -4.0  -7.5    2.3  6.5  6.6 
Central  8.7  20.8  -2.5  -2.7  -6.0    1.8  5.4  6.0 
Greater Accra  11.2  26.4  -0.4  0.0  -1.9    1.9  9.4  10.7 
Volta  7.6  26.6  -0.5  -1.0  -2.0    2.4  10.5  11.0 
Eastern  13.1  15.8  1.2  0.6  1.0    1.9  6.6  7.9 
Ashanti  17.6  18.2  -0.5  -1.1  -3.6    2.4  6.4  6.9 
Brong Ahafo  9.3  38.3  0.0  -1.8  -3.1    1.6  4.7  5.8 
Northern  13.2  56.7  -4.1  -6.3  -10.1    -1.4  1.5  1.3 
Upper East  4.9  69.9  1.3  0.7  -0.5    1.7  7.5  6.8 
Upper West  3.7  77.9  -0.6  -2.2  -5.9    0.0  2.6  2.6 
Rural  65.5  39.7  -1.6  -3.2  -6.2    0.9  4.5  4.4 
Urban  34.5  22.4  0.4  0.6  0.1    2.7  9.1  10.9 
Female hh head  23.2  25.9  0.4  0.1  -1.4    2.6  7.1  7.9 
Male hh head  76.8  36.1  -1.3  -2.5  -4.9    1.2  5.8  6.3 
1 child  11.6  14.7  0.5  0.2  -0.3    1.6  4.3  5.0 
2 children  21.6  22.6  -0.5  -1.1  -2.0    2.1  7.6  8.7 
3 children  24.9  27.8  -0.7  -1.3  -3.1    1.3  6.5  7.5 
4 children  18.4  39.2  -0.9  -2.6  -4.5    2.4  6.5  6.5 
5 children  11.4  44.4  -0.2  -0.7  -3.7    3.0  7.7  8.8 
6 children or more  12.1  65.5  -3.7  -6.5  -12.9    -2.0  2.1  1.1 
  Source : Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
Note: Rates for the base year are estimated from the GLSS 5 and reported in their absolute values 
while those relative to the other scenarios are simulated and expressed as the difference in % points 
to the "base" value 
 
Ghana’s efforts at poverty reduction would have paid off in absence of the global crisis. The 
‘Business as Usual’ scenario indicates that Ghana would have achieved poverty reduction of 
0.9, 1.9 and 4.1 percentage points for 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively in comparison with 
the base year (i.e. around 376,000 children would have escaped poverty by 2011).
5 This is in 
line with the decreasing trend in poverty rates (Ghana Statistical Service, 2007) and with the 
sustained economic growth experienced by Ghana over the last decade. Without the crisis, all 
regions would have experienced some level of poverty reduction by 2011, with the exception 
of the Eastern region only. While the Western, Central and Northern regions would have 
experienced  the  greatest  reduction  in  poverty  by  2011,  the  Eastern  region  would  have 
registered an increase in child poverty by 1 percentage point by 2011. This reduction in child 
monetary poverty is concentrated in rural areas with reductions of up to 6.2 percentage points 
in 2011, while in urban areas substantial stability over time would have been observed.  
                                                 
5 The absolute changes shown throughout this document already take into account the growth in the child population (0-14 
years old) and the average annual value observed between 2004 and 2008 (=1.3%) has been used.  
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Children living in households headed by a male would have experienced a relatively greater 
reduction in poverty than children living in a female-headed household over the three year 
period. A notable observation is that the reduction in child poverty is positively correlated 
with the number of children. 
 
Results from the simulations for the crisis scenario indicate that it would impact negatively 
on poverty and to a large extent erode the gains made in poverty reduction over the preceding 
years.
6 The economic crisis would in fact increase the child poverty headcount by 1.5, 6.1 
and 6.6 percentage points for 2009, 2010 and 2011 (corresponding to 630,000 additional 
children  in  poverty  by  2011)  respectively,  thus  making  government  intervention  urgently 
necessary in order to limit the damage. Child monetary poverty is expected to worsen in all 
regions, with Eastern, Volta and Greater Accra simulated to be the hardest hit, while the 
primarily rural regions – Northern and Upper West – would be the least affected over the 
three  year period.  In  confirmation of this result, children living in urban areas would be 
significantly more affected than those residing in rural areas. As shown in Cockburn, Fofana 
and  Tiberti  (2010),  the  deterioration  in  child  monetary  poverty,  primarily  driven  by  a 
reduction in consumer purchasing power and a large drop in income in the non-agriculture 
sector, is in fact partly offset by the increase in agricultural incomes (both from sales and 
own-production) following a continuous food price increase.  
 
There is little difference in the impact of the crisis on child poverty by the gender of the 
household  head,  though  the  impact  will  be  slightly  more  intense  for  children  in  female 
headed households. The negative impact of the economic crisis on the incidence of child 
poverty  among  households  with  1  to  5  children  is  quite  clear  and  relatively  evenly 
distributed,  while  the  impact  is  substantially  lower  on  children  living  with  more  than  5 
siblings but who already have a much higher probability of being poor. As around 90% of 
this subgroup of children (who represent 12% of the total child population) live in rural areas, 
a possible explanation of their lower impacts could be that the households where they live 
would benefit from the gains present in the agriculture sector as described above. 
 
The poverty gap, which measures the depth of poverty,
7 is analyzed in table 10 and tends to 
support the results found for the poverty headcount, although changes over the BaU and crisis 
scenarios  and  over  the  three  years  are  relatively  more  evenly  distributed.  As  for  the 
headcount,  the  poverty  gap  tends  to  be  higher  in  the  three  northern  regions  –  Northern 
(22.9%), Upper East (30.1%) and Upper West (36.5%) – and far higher than the national 
average of 11.2%, while the lowest child poverty gap is seen in the Ashanti region. While the 
poverty gap among male children is higher than among female children that of rural children 
is higher than among urban children. 
In the absence of the crisis, the poverty gap is projected to fall over the period 2009-2011. 
With  the  exception  of  Greater  Accra,  Volta  and  Ashanti  and  Eastern  Regions  –  as,  on 
average, for all urban areas – all the other regions as well as rural areas would have recorded 
a reduction in the poverty gap among children.  
                                                 
6 The official national headcount poverty rate in 1991 was 51.7 per cent, in 1998 39.5 per cent and in 2005/06 
28.5 per cent (Ghana Statistical Service 2007). 
7 Poverty gap ratio (or depth of poverty) is the average amount of money needed to raise all the poor from their 
consumption level to the poverty line. It is expressed as share of the poverty.  
18 
 
Children living in male-headed households would have achieved higher reductions in the 
poverty  gap  as  compared  to  those  in  female-headed  households.  Finally,  apart  from 
households with a single child, all other households would have recorded a reduction in the 
poverty  gap.  With  the  crisis,  Greater  Accra  and  Upper  East  would  be  confirmed  as  the 
regions most affected in terms of a deterioration in the depth of poverty, and Northern and 
Upper  West  would  be  confirmed  as  those  with  the  lowest  increase  in  the  poverty  gap. 
According to our simulations, however, Volta, which was amongst the regions showing the 
highest predicted increase of child poverty rate, stays in line with the national value of the 
poverty gap. 
Table 10: Monetary poverty gap in base year, BaU and crisis scenarios by region, sex, 
locality and number of children in the household 




BaU    Crisis 
2009  2010  2011    2009  2010  2011 
All Children  100  11.2  -0.3  -0.6  -0.9    0.6  2.7  3.3 
Western  10.6  10.7  -0.1  -1.1  -2.0    0.9  3.1  3.6 
Central  8.7  4.5  -0.5  -0.8  -0.5    0.3  2.1  2.5 
Greater Accra  11.2  8.8  0.3  0.3  0.3    1.4  4.0  5.0 
Volta  7.6  6.0  0.0  0.2  0.5    0.7  2.7  3.5 
Eastern  13.1  4.3  0.3  0.5  0.8    0.6  2.3  3.0 
Ashanti  17.6  4.2  -0.3  -0.1  0.1    0.4  2.2  2.9 
Brong Ahafo  9.3  11.4  -0.3  -0.6  -1.1    0.7  2.8  3.5 
Northern  13.2  22.9  -1.2  -2.4  -4.0    0.0  2.3  2.4 
Upper East  4.9  30.1  -0.1  0.0  -1.0    1.1  4.3  5.5 
Upper West  3.7  36.5  -1.0  -2.9  -5.4    0.7  2.4  2.5 
Rural  65.5  13.3  -0.5  -1.2  -1.9    0.4  2.2  2.6 
Urban  34.5  7.1  0.2  0.5  0.8    1.1  3.6  4.8 
Female hh head  23.2  7.3  0.0  0.0  0.0    1.0  3.0  3.7 
Male hh head  76.8  12.4  -0.4  -0.8  -1.2    0.5  2.6  3.2 
1 child  11.6  4.5  0.4  0.5  0.6    0.8  2.3  3.0 
2 children  21.6  6.7  0.0  -0.3  -0.2    0.8  2.7  3.4 
3 children  24.9  9.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2    0.6  2.5  3.1 
4 children  18.4  13.1  -0.5  -0.8  -1.0    0.7  3.0  3.7 
5 children  11.4  15.1  0.1  -0.3  -0.9    1.0  3.7  4.6 
6 children or more  12.1  23.7  -1.6  -2.9  -5.1    -0.1  2.3  2.4 
  Source : Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
Note: Rates for the base year are estimated from the GLSS 5 and reported in their absolute values 
while those relative to the other scenarios are simulated and expressed as difference in % points to 
the "base-year" value 
4.2.2 Hunger under the baseline and crisis scenarios 
Table 11 presents the hunger rates for children in the base year and under the BaU and the 
crisis scenarios simulated over the 2009-2011 period. Hunger among children for the base 
year is about 58.5%, which corresponded to slightly less than 5.5 million children. Although 
this result might be somewhat biased by the relatively poor appropriateness of the price data 
(as discussed in Section 3), it is in line with the figure reported by Ahmed et al. (2007), which 
shows a hunger rate for the total population in Ghana in 1998 equal to 56.7%.
8  
                                                 
8 The methodology and the definition of “hunger” followed in Ahmed et al. (2007) are the same as those used in 
this study. They only differ in the caloric poverty line: The study by Ahmed et al. set the caloric poverty line at 
2200 kcal, we fixed it at 2450 kcal. When a caloric poverty line at 2200 kcal is used, we found a headcount 
hunger rate equal to 52.4%.  
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As already mentioned above, we believe that the variation in the hunger rate over the period 
of  the  analysis  and  across  the  different  scenarios  is  able  to  provide  information  that  is 
sufficiently useful and robust, even if the levels may be overestimated through the use of 
official price data. 
Disaggregated results by regions indicate that hunger rates for the base  year in the three 
northern regions – Northern (70.1%), Upper West (86.5%) and Upper East (80.7%) – and the 
Western  region  (69.3%)  are  substantially  higher  than  the  national  average.  This  regional 
ranking is fairly in line with what we found for the monetary poverty, although the incidence 
is substantially higher and a relatively lower inter-regional variation should be noted. This 
confirms that hunger is more a rural phenomenon, but children living in urban areas and with 
an insufficient calorie intake should still represent a real preoccupation for the policy maker. 
As expected, hunger increases with the number of children in a household. Also, children 
living in male-headed households show a higher hunger rate (60.9%) than those living in 
female-headed households (50.4%). 
Unlike  monetary  poverty,  in  the  absence  of  the  crisis,  hunger  would  have  remained 
substantially  unchanged  over  the  three-year  period:  this  result  actually  masks  some 
differences within the country. Rural and northern regions (Northern, Upper East and Upper 
West  regions)  would  have  experienced  significant  decreases  by  2011,  while  the  average 
change in urban areas as well as in the Eastern region would have resulted in a remarkable 
increase  of  3.5  and  5.7  percentage  points  respectively.  These  results  point  to  the  serious 
nature of urban poverty, even in the absence of the crisis. Finally, hunger for children living 
in households with more than 5 children would have reduced significantly, while a slight 
increase or no change would have been registered for children with fewer siblings.  
Table 11: Hunger headcount rates in base year, BaU and crisis scenarios by region, sex, 
locality and number of children in the household 




BaU    Crisis 
2009  2010  2011  2009  2010  2011 
All Children  100  58.5  0.6  0.4  -0.1    4.2  6.2  6.6 
Western  10.6  69.3  -0.3  -0.5  -1.9    4.0  6.1  7.4 
Central  8.7  41.5  2.4  3.2  3.6    5.3  7.0  8.0 
Greater Accra  11.2  59.0  1.0  0.6  -1.0    6.7  10.0  10.3 
Volta  7.6  57.0  -0.3  -2.0  -1.9    2.0  4.0  4.6 
Eastern  13.1  42.2  3.4  4.5  5.7    6.6  9.6  11.0 
Ashanti  17.6  51.9  2.0  1.8  1.7    5.9  8.3  9.1 
Brong Ahafo  9.3  58.6  0.7  1.1  -0.1    4.0  5.9  6.6 
Northern  13.2  70.1  -4.3  -5.2  -6.4    0.8  1.2  -0.8 
Upper East  4.9  80.7  -0.2  0.0  -1.4    1.0  1.6  1.8 
Upper West  3.7  86.5  0.0  -1.0  -2.1    0.5  0.5  0.5 
Rural  65.5  61.7  -0.6  -1.1  -1.9    2.4  3.8  3.7 
Urban  34.5  51.7  3.0  3.6  3.5    8.0  11.3  12.8 
Female hh head  23.2  50.4  2.3  2.7  2.8    5.7  8.2  9.3 
Male hh head  76.8  60.9  0.1  -0.2  -1.0    3.8  5.6  5.8 
1 child  11.6  38.8  1.3  1.2  0.8    5.1  7.7  8.6 
2 children  21.6  49.4  1.7  1.4  1.4    5.2  8.3  9.5 
3 children  24.9  55.7  0.8  0.9  0.9    4.8  6.7  7.6 
4 children  18.4  64.2  1.3  0.5  0.6    4.4  5.9  6.7 
5 children  11.4  67.1  2.2  2.7  1.1    5.3  6.7  7.5 
6 children or more  12.1  82.4  -5.3  -5.4  -7.9    -1.0  -0.1  -3.3 
  Source : Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
 
Note: rates for the base year are estimated from the GLSS 5 and reported in their absolute values while those 




The global crisis is predicted to severely worsen hunger among children. Child hunger rates 
are simulated to increase by 4.2, 6.2 and 6.6 percentage points for 2009, 2010 and 2011 
(around  620,000  additional  children  by  2011)  respectively,  thus  reflecting  the  pattern 
observed for monetary poverty but with a rapid increase in hunger starting already in 2009. 
According to our simulations, all regions will experience an increase in child hunger, with the 
single exception of the Northern region where a slight improvement (-0.8 percentage points) 
by 2011 is forecast. In order, Eastern, Greater Accra and Volta regions will be the worst 
affected regions by 2011 while, as for monetary poverty, the rural Northern regions are the 
least affected. The crisis is expected to dramatically reduce the urban/rural gap in terms of 
hunger  by  largely  affecting  urban  areas  (in  2011,  an  increase  by  12.8  percentage  points, 
compared to +3.7 in rural areas). Finally, children living in female headed households as well 
as those living with fewer siblings seem to be relatively more affected by the crisis in terms 
of their calorie intake. On the contrary, in line with what has already been seen for monetary 
poverty, children living in households with more than 5 children would largely benefit from 
the potential gains in the agriculture sector by showing a substantial improvement in terms of 
their  calorie  intake  (a  reduction  in  hunger  rates  by  3.3  percentage  points  by  2011  in 
comparison with the base year). 
 
From table 12 we learn that the way in which Ghana was pursuing its policies before the 
crisis would not have led to any reduction in the depth of child hunger: indeed, under the BaU 
scenario  the  child  poverty  gap  would  have  increased  by  1.1  percentage  points  by  2011, 
starting from a value already worryingly high (23.9%). This denotes that, despite a general 
increase in the predicted levels of monetary consumption which led to reduction in both the 
incidence and the gap of monetary poverty, the simulated increase in food prices under the 
BaU affected the poorest proportionately more than those just below the poverty line. New 
interventions to cope with the hunger issue need to be implemented, irrespective of the crisis, 
which has, however, undoubtedly increased the urgency. Again, wide internal differences 
emerge with the northern rural regions showing the greatest hunger gap: in Upper West it is 
50.2% or, in other terms, on average children living in this region would need to double their 
calorie intakes in order to satisfy their minimum caloric needs (an additional 1230 kcal to 
reach 2450 kcal a day). However, only these regions would have registered some reduction in 
the hunger gap in the absence of the crisis and, with the exception of the Upper East region, 
they are expected to be the least affected by the crisis.  
 
With the crisis, by 2011 the hunger gap in urban areas would deteriorate to such an extent 
that it would substantially reach the rate predicted for rural areas. Finally, changes and levels 
of the hunger gap under the different scenarios according to the number of children in the 
household and the gender of the household head broadly follow the pattern already discussed 









Table 12: Hunger poverty gaps in base year, BaU and crisis scenarios by region, sex, 







BaU    Crisis 
2009  2010  2011  2009  2010  2011 
All Children  100  23.9  0.7  1.0  1.1    2.5  4.3  5.0 
Western  10.6  27.3  0.9  0.8  0.6    2.8  4.5  5.2 
Central  8.7  14.1  0.4  0.7  1.3    2.1  3.8  4.5 
Greater Accra  11.2  25.3  1.1  1.3  0.9    3.9  6.6  7.5 
Volta  7.6  18.2  1.0  1.9  2.6    2.6  4.3  5.3 
Eastern  13.1  14.1  1.3  2.1  3.1    2.4  4.2  5.4 
Ashanti  17.6  18.5  0.8  1.4  1.7    2.9  5.0  5.8 
Brong Ahafo  9.3  19.6  0.8  1.4  1.9    2.4  4.2  5.0 
Northern  13.2  35.6  -0.6  -1.1  -2.2    0.8  2.2  2.3 
Upper East  4.9  41.6  1.0  1.3  0.5    2.5  4.4  5.3 
Upper West  3.7  50.2  0.3  0.0  -1.0    1.2  1.7  2.0 
Rural  65.5  25.9  0.3  0.3  0.1    1.7  3.0  3.5 
Urban  34.5  19.7  1.5  2.4  3.0    4.1  6.9  8.3 
Female hh head  23.2  19.0  1.0  1.5  1.7    3.0  4.9  5.8 
Male hh head  76.8  25.4  0.6  0.9  0.8    2.3  4.1  4.8 
1 child  11.6  13.5  1.0  1.3  1.5    2.5  4.3  5.2 
2 children  21.6  18.2  0.9  1.2  1.5    2.8  4.8  5.7 
3 children  24.9  21.9  0.8  1.3  1.4    2.5  4.4  5.1 
4 children  18.4  27.3  0.6  0.8  0.9    2.6  4.5  5.2 
5 children  11.4  28.9  1.3  1.9  2.0    2.9  4.8  5.9 
6 children or more 12.1  38.1  -0.5  -0.6  -1.5    1.0  2.2  2.4 
  Source: Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
Note: Rates for the base year are estimated from the GLSS 5 and reported in their absolute values while 
those relative to the other scenarios are simulated and expressed as difference in % points to the "base" 
value 
4.2.3 Impact on schooling and child labour under the baseline and crisis scenarios 
Table 13 shows the participation rates of children involved in work activities and in school. 
In  the  base  year,  the  average  estimated  school  attendance  rate  for  children  aged  6-14  is 
84.1%. The participation rates for the 6-10 year olds is slightly lower at 82.9%, while that of 
the 11-14 age group is 85.7%. Disaggregation of the participation rate by gender of the child 
shows  that  girls  have  participation  rates  0.5  percentage  points  higher  than  boys  (82.7%) 
among  the  6-10  age  group.  However,  for  the  11-14  age  group,  boys  (86.1%)  have  a 
marginally higher participation rate than girls. Children living in urban areas show a higher 
participation rate than their rural counterparts. This difference is greater for the 6-10 age 
group (15.5 percentage points), compared to the 11-14 age group (11.5 percentage points).  
 
Higher school participation rates are observed for the coastal regions – Western, Central and 
Greater Accra as well as Ashanti and Eastern regions in the forest zone (above 89%) – while 
it is substantially lower in the northern regions, reaching its lowest rate in the Northern region 
(57% and 58.1% for the 6-10 and 11-14 age groups, respectively). In most regions there is a 
higher school participation rate for the 11-14 age group compared to the 6-10 year olds with 
the exception of Ashanti region where a lower rate of 3.2 percentage points is observed. The 
largest change moving from the 6-10 age group to the 11-14 age group of 10.5 percentage 
points is observed in Volta region: this might indicate deterioration in school participation 
over the last years in comparison with the previous years, both coming from higher drop-out 




Turning to child labour rates, the overall participation rate is 34.4%. The age sub-group 6-10 
has 11.9 percentage points more involvement compared to the 11-14 age group, which may 
be driven at least partly by the difference in the definition of “child labour” between the two 
age groups. Gender disaggregation of the child labour rate also shows that girls have a higher 
involvement rate than boys in both age sub groups: specifically, 1.6 percentage points for the 
6-10 age group increasing to 8.2 percentage points for the 11-14 age group. 
 
The lowest labour participation rates for the younger group are observed in Greater Accra 
(23.6%).  Child  labour  rates  in  the  remaining  nine  regions  are  all  above  30%  with  the 
Northern and Upper West regions posting labour rates of more than 50% for the 6-10 age 
group, probably reflecting large involvement of children in the farming and livestock related 
activities of their households. In comparison with the 6-10 age group, children aged 11 to 14 
years old in all the regions except for Upper West posted significantly lower child labour 
participation rates, varying from a difference of 18.6 percentage points in Western region to 
0.9 percentage points in the Northern region. 
Table 13: School and labour participation rates for children 6-14 years before the crisis 
  S/NW  S/W  NS/W  NS/NW  S  W    S/NW  S/W  NS/W  NS/NW  S  W 
age sub-group  Age 6-10    Age 11-14 
Total  54.2  28.7  10.7  6.4  82.9  39.4    68.1  17.6  9.9  4.4  85.7  27.5 
Sex                                       
   Female  53.7  29.4  10.8  6.1  83.1  40.2    64.0  21.3  10.3  4.4  85.3  31.6 
   Male  54.7  28.0  10.6  6.7  82.7  38.6    72.2  13.9  9.5  4.4  86.1  23.4 
Area                                       
   Rural  48.1  29.8  14.1  8.0  77.9  43.8    62.1  19.5  13.5  4.87  81.6  33.0 
   Urban  67.0  26.4  3.5  3.1  93.4  29.9    78.9  14.2  3.4  3.55  93.1  17.6 
Region                                       
  Western  60.1  31.5  5.0  3.4  91.6  36.5    79.2  13.4  4.6  2.9  92.6  17.9 
  Central  57.3  35.1  4.1  3.6  92.3  39.1    71.5  23.5  2.9  2.2  94.9  26.3 
  Greater 
Accra 
70.5  20.1  3.5  6.0  90.6  23.6    85.6  7.1  2.2  5.2  92.6  9.3 
  Volta  52.5  23.3  16.2  8.0  75.8  39.5    64.5  21.8  10.8  2.9  86.3  32.6 
  Eastern  52.5  36.5  6.9  4.2  89.0  43.3    66.3  25.6  6.8  1.3  91.9  32.3 
  Ashanti  63.2  30.6  5.0  1.2  93.8  35.6    75.2  15.5  6.3  3.1  90.6  21.7 
  Brong Ahafo  64.1  24.6  7.2  4.1  88.8  31.8    82.0  9.9  6.9  1.3  91.8  16.7 
  Northern  30.3  26.8  28.5  14.5  57.0  55.3    37.3  20.8  33.5  8.4  58.1  54.3 
  Upper East  36.3  25.1  18.1  20.5  61.4  43.2    46.5  17.7  16.4  19.4  64.2  34.1 
  Upper West  37.1  27.8  25.4  9.7  64.9  53.3    34.3  32.9  23.5  9.4  67.2  56.4 
Source: Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
Note: S/NW=schooling and not working; S/W=schooling and working; NS/W=not schooling and working; 
NS/NW=not schooling and not working.  
The average schooling rate (S) for children aged 6 to 14 years old is 84.1%, the child labour rate (W) is 34.4%. 
In detail: S/NW is 60%, S/W is 24.1%, NS/W is 10.3% and NS/NW is 5.6 
 
If we look more carefully at the possible combinations of child activities – schooling and not 
working (S/NW), schooling and  working (S/W), not schooling  and working (NS/W), not 
schooling and not working (NS/NW) – we find out that the situation of younger children is 
even worse. Among children aged 6 to 10 years old, of those going to school more than a 
third is also involved in work activities, while this share reduces to a fifth for older children.   
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The capacity for, and thus the quality of, learning for younger school children is more at risk 
than for their older counterparts. In the Northern region, where about half of school going 
children also work, this preoccupation should be of particular relevance. It is also notable that 
in  the  Northern  region  the  rate  of  “idle”  children  is  substantially  higher  than  elsewhere, 
particular for younger school age children (20.5% in Upper East region). Finally, for the 6-10 
age group, no clear differences related to the child’s gender emerge, while amongst the 11-14 
years old a substantially larger rate of girls both attend school and work (while the total 
school rate masked these differences between boys and girls), thus corresponding to a lower 
rate of girls only going to school.  
 
Table  14  presents  simulation  of  BaU  and  crisis  scenarios  for  schooling  and  labour 
participation  among  the  6-10  age  group.  Under  BaU,  school  participation  would  have 
improved and resulted in an increase of around 0.5 percentage points in 2011. A similar 
decrease  in  the  number  of  working  children  is  not  observed,  as  the  increase  in  school 
participation  is  drawn  evenly  among  children  previously  only  going  to  school  and  those 
going  to  school  and  working.  Opposite  figures  are  predicted  for  the  crisis  scenario  (i.e. 
deterioration in schooling and increase in work participation) leading to a potential loss in the 
number of 6-10 year old school going children of up to 0.7% (school participation in 2011 
under BaU versus under crisis, corresponding to around 9000 children). As for older children 
(table  15),  the  pattern  of  results  is  similar  to  those  for  younger  children,  although  the 
variations  are  smaller.  The  only  notable  exception  is  related  to  working  children  as  the 
variation in those combining with school is predicted to prevail (both under the BaU and the 
crisis) in comparison with those predicted as only working. The result is a total increase 
(under the BaU) and reduction (under the crisis) in the number of working children.  
 
Table 14: School and labour participation for 6-10 age group 
   school/no work  school/work  no school/work  no school/no work  school  work 
Base year (estimated)  54.209  28.679  10.685  6.425  82.888  39.364 
BaU 2009  0.036  0.038  -0.044  -0.029  0.073  -0.006 
BaU 2010  0.115  0.106  -0.131  -0.090  0.221  -0.025 
BaU 2011  0.232  0.200  -0.262  -0.170  0.432  -0.062 
Crisis 2009  -0.045  -0.030  0.039  0.037  -0.076  0.008 
Crisis 2010  -0.161  -0.132  0.157  0.137  -0.294  0.025 
Crisis 2011  -0.175  -0.141  0.166  0.150  -0.316  0.025 
Source: Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
Note: Estimated rates for the base year are reported in % while values relative to the other scenarios are 
expressed as % point difference of the simulated values relative to the estimated "base" value 
 
Table 15: School and labour participation for 11-14 age group  
   school/no work  school/work  no school/work  no school/no work  school  work 
Base year (estimated)  68.147  17.571  9.880  4.400  85.718  27.451 
BaU 2009  0.007  0.027  -0.019  -0.015  0.035  0.008 
BaU 2010  0.021  0.088  -0.060  -0.050  0.110  0.028 
BaU 2011  0.043  0.180  -0.123  -0.100  0.223  0.057 
Crisis 2009  -0.008  -0.034  0.019  0.022  -0.041  -0.014 
Crisis 2010  -0.029  -0.114  0.070  0.074  -0.144  -0.044 
Crisis 2011  -0.032  -0.123  0.075  0.080  -0.155  -0.049 
Source: Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
Note: Estimated rates for the base year are reported in % while values relative to the other scenarios are 




4.2.4 Access to health care under the baseline and crisis scenarios 
Table 16 shows the distribution of whether children who reported any sickness consulted a 
health facility and the type of health facility consulted for the base year. The table shows that 
61% of sick children (around 1 million children) consulted a health facility. The distribution 
across the health facilities is hospitals (29.9%), clinics (32.5%), pharmacy (32.1%) and other
9 
(5.6%). The gender of the child did not seem to influence the decision to consult a health 
facility and the type of health facility consulted as roughly similar rates are observed for both 
sexes.  The  children  in  urban  areas  (68.4%)  are  more  likely  to  consult  a  health  facility 
compared to children living in the rural areas (57.7%). Specifically, consultations in hospitals 
are frequently used most in urban areas while almost no children are visited by practitioners 
offering a lower quality service. In rural areas clinics are the first place where sick children 
consult (36.1%), closely followed by pharmacies (33.2%). In general, self-care, despite its 
long-term negative effects, is adopted by more than a third of sick children. Large differences 
across the regions also clearly emerge.  
Table 16: Consultation rates and type of health facility consulted at the base year for 
children who were ill (in percentages) 
  
Health consultation 
among all sick 
children 
  Type of health facility consulted among 
sick children who asked for health 
consultation       Hospital  Clinic  Pharmacy   Other 
Total  61.0    29.9  32.5  32.1  5.5 
Sex                   
   Female  61.5    28.2  34.4  32.4  5.0 
   Male  60.6    31.5  30.6  31.8  6.1 
Area                  
   Rural  57.7    23.1  36.1  33.2  7.5 
   Urban  68.4    42.4  25.7  30.0  1.9 
Region                  
   Western  75.5    21.9  36.7  39.7  1.8 
   Central  47.6    54.1  22.6  14.4  8.9 
   Greater Accra  60.0    38.4  40.5  18.9  2.2 
   Volta  49.6    16.4  38.3  27.3  18.0 
   Eastern  53.8    36.3  37.7  24.3  1.6 
   Ashanti  69.8    33.9  18.7  44.8  2.6 
   Brong Ahafo  64.0    25.5  42.7  27.4  4.4 
   Northern  61.7    23.5  28.3  38.2  10.0 
   Upper East  58.3    34.2  35.8  23.3  6.8 
   Upper West  50.5    19.1  63.1  8.0  9.8 
Source: Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
 
According to our simulations (table 17), without the crisis an improvement in consultation 
compared to the baseline would have been possible. More specifically, households are shown 
to increasingly send their children to hospitals and clinics and reduce their consultation of 
pharmacies and other categories of lower quality health service providers. In contrast, with 
simulation of the crisis, a reversal is observed. We predict a decline in health consultation of 
nearly 1 percentage point (equivalent to around 6000 children) together with a drop in visits 
to hospitals and clinics and these are again due to the drop in income and the increasing 
difficulty that households are likely to face in meeting health costs. Pharmacies and other 
options become more popular and an increase in their consultation is forecast.  
                                                 
9 These include the consultant’s home or categories of health facilities outside the officially provided facilities 
such as traditional healers including herbalists, medicine men, wanzams, juju men etc.  
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The  substantial  diversion  towards  self-care  is  thus  adopted  as  a  coping  mechanism  by 
households  during  a  period  of  crisis,  while  the  use  of  traditional  healers  is  basically 
unchanged in comparison with the base year. 




among all sick 
children   
Type of health facility consulted 
among sick children who asked for 
health consultation 
Hospital  Clinic  Pharmacy  Other 
Base year (estimated)  61.034    29.908  32.462  32.083  5.546 
BaU 2009  0.021    0.014  0.071  -0.077  -0.008 
BaU 2010  0.133    0.102  0.244  -0.314  -0.032 
BaU 2011  0.241    0.210  0.538  -0.677  -0.071 
Crisis 2009  -0.172    -0.194  -0.098  0.277  0.015 
Crisis 2010  -0.493    -0.524  -0.283  0.766  0.041 
Crisis 2011  -0.563    -0.599  -0.296  0.852  0.043 
Source: Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
Note: Estimated rates for the base year are reported in % while values relative to the other scenarios are 
expressed as % point difference of the simulated values relative to the estimated "base" value 
4.3 Simulations of alternative policy responses  
Our analysis shows that initial conditions and the magnitude of the impact of the global 
economic crisis on the transmission variables determine the macro and micro impacts on 
Ghana’s  economy.  Although  the  world  economy  is  stabilizing,  our  analysis  shows  that 
Ghana’s economy and children’s well-being are more affected during this phase than the 
crisis period itself. This is mainly due to the (observed) early rebound of world import prices 
while  the  other  transmission  variables  (export  volumes,  foreign  inflows),  which  have  a 
positive  impact  on  the  Ghanaian  economy,  remain  depressed.  Therefore,  the  design  and 
implementation  of  appropriate  economic  policies  in  response  to  the  global  crisis  will 
considerably contribute to reducing its welfare cost, in particular for children. 
 
When government faces a tight budgetary constraint, a reduction in government current and 
investment spending and/or an increase in taxes are policies that can be undertaken to balance 
its  budget.  This  is  known  as  a  pro-cyclical  fiscal  policy  response.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy response would be to increase government spending on public 
services and/or cut domestic taxes. 
 
However, the Government in Ghana has been running a fiscal deficit over recent years and, 
consequently, is not in a position to engage in counter-cyclical policy responses. Indeed, as 
the fiscal deficit deepens in the face of the global crisis, it may even have to turn to pro-
cyclical policies that aim to reduce public spending and increase tax revenues, which will 
increase  the  short-term  vulnerability  of  the  national  economy  and  further  exacerbate  the 
effects of the crisis. The impact of tax increases would depend on their nature, income taxes 
being, for example, generally progressive, whereas sales taxes are often regressive. Spending 
cuts would tend to hit poor households disproportionately, to the extent that they reduce the 




This  study  quantifies  the  impact  of  two  counter-cyclical  stimulus  programmes  entirely 
financed  from  external  sources  (international  aid)  aiming  to  protect  children  from  the 
negative effects of the global economic crisis:  
 
-  Consumption oriented fiscal stimulus: consumption tax cuts (VAT or tariff) on food 
products (Response 1).  
 
-  Targeted cash/in-kind transfers to poor children aged 0 to 14 years who are identified 
using a proxy-means test approach (Response 2). The estimated individual annual amount 
is 19.8 Cedis. The effectiveness of this policy is compared to that of a universal transfer 
programme to all children younger than 6.   
 
The total budget for each programme is arbitrary fixed at 1% of the 2008 national GDP. 
 
We  also  simulated  additional  domestically-funded  policy  responses  for  Ghana  that  were 
proposed and discussed with local committees. Specifically, they consist of targeted cash 
transfers  financed  through  a  20%  increase  in  tariffs  on  rice  imports  and  an  endogenous 
increase in tariffs on non-food manufacturing goods imports (Response 3). Alternatively, an 
endogenous increase in the property tax is also explored to finance the cash/in-kind transfer 
programme (Response 4). The two financing mechanisms are both constructed in a way that 
the government is able to raise an amount equivalent to 0.5% of GDP in base-year terms and 
the estimated individual annual amount is 10 Cedis. 
 
The  total  budget  amount  allocated  for  these  policies  does  not  take  into  account  the 
administrative costs needed to put them in place. 
 
The proposed stimulus packages have little in terms of macroeconomic effects (tables in 
Annex III). Consequently our analysis in the next section focuses solely on the effects on 
child welfare.  
 
Before analyzing the effectiveness of each policy response proposed in this study, it is worth 
discussing the performance of the targeting model we have adopted to identify poor children 
for cash transfers. It is to some extent inevitable that errors will occur in accurately targeting 
poor  households,  based  on  easily  observable  characteristics,  and  this  will  affect  policy 
effectiveness.  Thus,  households  that  are  not  below  the  poverty  line  might  receive  some 
transfers that are intended for poor households while some poor households might not receive 
transfers. The proposed model of targeting is able to correctly identify as poor around 80% of 
actual  poor  children  (actual  status  for  survey  households  can  be  assessed  from  income-
expenditure  data),  while  the  other  20%  are  incorrectly  identified  as  non-poor  and  thus 
excluded. A further 37% of children identified as non-poor are wrongly identified as poor 
using our model (see Annex II, table B). 
4.3.1 Monetary poverty under different policy responses 
Table 18 presents results of the simulation of the four policy responses. As discussed earlier, 
in the absence of the global financial crisis Ghana would have experienced a reduction in  
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monetary poverty among children of about 0.9, 1.9 and 4.1 percentage points for 2009, 2010 
and 2011, respectively, compared to the base year. But with the global economic crisis, the 
incidence of monetary poverty among children is expected to worsen over the period 2009-
2011 and some interventions to counteract it must be taken soon. 
 
Providing price subsidies for food products prices (Response 1) would slightly diminish the 
effect of the crisis in terms of child monetary poverty, by reducing the incidence by around 1 
percentage point in comparison with the results under the crisis. 
 
With the same budget (1% of GDP in 2008 terms, again financed through external aid), a 
cash  transfer  to  poor  children  (as  predicted  by  the  proxy-means  model)  is  simulated  to 
produce better outcomes in terms of the reduction of child monetary poverty after the crisis. 
Specifically, in 2009 this response would be able to bring the monetary poverty rate below 
base-year levels, while in the two following years – as the crisis has an increasing impact – 
the transfer would be able only to partly offset the effects of the crisis but would still cut the 
predicted increase in monetary poverty by a third – over 2 percentage points (around 200,000 
children) – in 2011. 
 
When the amount of the total budget is halved to 0.5% of GDP in 2008 terms and financed 
from domestic sources, whether this is through taxes on specific imports or property taxation, 
cash transfers have similar effects, as poverty increases by almost the same margins in 2009, 
2010 and 2011. These are very similar results to those obtained under the food price subsidy 
policy (with a budget twice as large at 1% of GDP). 














Base year (estimated)  33.7     
Crisis 2009  35.2  1.5   
Crisis 2010  39.8  6.1   
Crisis 2011  40.4  6.6   
Resp 1 Food Subsidy 2009 (1% GDP)  34.3  0.6  -0.9 
Resp 1 Food Subsidy 2010 (1% GDP)  38.6  4.9  -1.2 
Resp 1 Food Subsidy 2011 (1% GDP)  39.6  5.9  -0.8 
Resp 2 Cash Transfer 2009 (1% GDP)  33.3  -0.4  -1.9 
Resp 2 Cash Transfer 2010 (1% GDP)  37.4  3.7  -2.4 
Resp 2 Cash Transfer 2011 (1% GDP)  38.2  4.5  -2.2 
Resp 3 Cash Transfer 2009+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  34.4  0.7  -0.8 
Resp 3 Cash Transfer 2010+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  38.8  5.1  -1.0 
Resp 3 Cash Transfer 2011+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  39.5  5.8  -0.9 
Resp 4 Cash Transfer 2009+PropertyTax (0.5% GDP)  34.5  0.8  -0.7 
Resp 4 Cash Transfer 2010+PropertyTax (0.5% GDP)  38.9  5.2  -0.9 
Resp 4 Cash Transfer 2011+PropertyTax (0.5% GDP)  39.6  5.9  -0.8 
Source: Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
 
Finally,  table  19  compares  results  for  monetary  poverty  of  the  targeted  cash  transfer 
discussed above (Response 2) to those of a universal cash transfer.   
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The  two  programmes  allocate  the  same  total  budget  –  1%  of  GDP  –  but  the  universal 
programme is applied only to children aged 0 to 5 years old. As for the targeted programme, 
we assume that transfers to all children in the household are pooled with other household 
income  and  shared  equitably  among  all  household  members.  As  the  total  population  of 
children aged 0 to 5 is smaller than the population of children aged 0 to 14 that are predicted 
to be poor (and thus targeted), the annual amount – in the survey’s year terms – transferred to 
each individual child would thus be larger under the targeted programme: 30.6 new Cedis in 
Ghana. When the entire child population is considered, providing a universal cash transfer to 
all children aged 0 to 5 years is very effective in reducing monetary poverty rates after the 
crisis. Results are very close to those simulated for a targeted cash transfer to all children 
predicted as poor. This good performance is the result of a combination of a higher individual 
transfer and of the elimination of the undercoverage errors from the targeting approach. 
 
Specifically, under the universal approach, monetary poverty rates are only 0 to +0.1 points 
higher with the universal cash transfer (for all children 0-5 years old) compared with the 
targeted approach (for poor children 0-14 years old). Moreover, if we consider only children 
aged 0 to 5 years old, who we may argue are the most vulnerable to the impacts of the crisis, 
then the universal approach is predicted to produce better performances in terms of monetary 
poverty than the targeted approach. In particular, their monetary poverty rates would be up to 
1 percentage point lower when a universal transfer is implemented. 
 
Finally, universal targeting is relatively easier to carry out and, at least in a first phase, may 
represent  a  more  cost-effective  alternative,  particularly  where  some  wealthier  households 
self-exclude themselves by deeming the amount of the transfer too small to collect, which 
would reduce leakage rates and the overall cost of the policy.  
Table 19: Child monetary poverty rates under targeted and universal transfer (in %), 
by different age groups 
  0-14 years old    0-5 years old 
  crisis  TT 0-14  UT 0-5   crisis  TT 0-14  UT 0-5 
Ghana  base-year poverty rate: 33.7%    base-year poverty rate: 31.3% 
2009  35.2  33.3  33.4   32.6  30.7  30.0 
2010  39.8  37.4  37.4   37.4  34.9  33.9 
2011  40.4  38.2  38.2   37.7  35.7  34.9 
Source: Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
Notes: “TT 0-14” is for targeted cash transfer to all (predicted) poor children aged 0 to 14 years old;  
“UT 0-5” is for universal transfer for all children aged 0 to 5 years old 
4.3.2 Hunger under different policy responses 
As shown in table 20, none of the policies simulated could restore hunger rates to base-year 
levels. Unlike monetary poverty, food subsidies have very similar effects on hunger to those 
obtained  through  aid-financed  targeted  cash  transfers,  marginally  decreasing  the  negative 
effects of the crisis. The impact of cash transfers and food subsidies is simulated to be a 
reduction of 1.4 percentage points in 2009 and less than one percentage point in 2011, that is 




Hunger is so deeply rooted that different and structural interventions would be required to 
really change the status of children. Domestically-financed targeted cash transfers, with half 
the overall budget, only reduce hunger rates by a few percentage points in comparison to the 
crisis scenario. 
Table 20: Results of simulations of policy options on hunger  
Scenarios   Hunger 
rate (%) 
Difference to the 
base year, 
percentage points 




Base year (estimated)  58.5     
Crisis 2009  62.7  4.2   
Crisis 2010  64.7  6.2   
Crisis 2011  65.1  6.6   
Resp 1 Food Subsidy 2009 (1% GDP)  61.3  2.8  -1.4 
Resp 1 Food Subsidy 2010 (1% GDP)  63.4  4.9  -1.3 
Resp 1 Food Subsidy 2011 (1% GDP)  64.2  5.7  -0.9 
Resp 2 Cash Transfer 2009 (1% GDP)  61.3  2.8  -1.4 
Resp 2 Cash Transfer 2010 (1% GDP)  63.4  4.9  -1.3 
Resp 2 Cash Transfer 2011 (1% GDP)  64.3  5.8  -0.8 
Resp 3 Cash Transfer 2009+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  62.0  3.5  -0.7 
Resp 3 Cash Transfer 2010+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  64.6  6.1  -0.1 
Resp 3 Cash Transfer 2011+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  64.8  6.3  -0.3 
Resp 4 Cash Transfer 2009+PropertyTax (0.5% GDP)  61.8  3.3  -0.9 
Resp 4 Cash Transfer 2010+PopertyTax (0.5% GDP)  64.4  5.9  -0.3 
Resp 4 Cash Transfer 2011+PropertyTax (0.5% GDP)  64.7  6.2  -0.4 
Source: Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
4.3.3 Child schooling and labour under different policy responses 
Table  21  presents  the  results  of  the  different  policy  responses  on  school  and  labour 
participation  for  the  6-10  age  group.  A  cursory  glance  at  the  table  indicates  that  all  the 
policies simulated would lead to a modest increase in schooling in comparison with the crisis 
values but would not be able to bring school participation rates back to base-year values, with 
the exception of the aid-financed cash transfer programme (Response 2) in 2009. On average, 
changes in work participation in comparison with the base year are small, as increases in the 
percentage of children combining work and school almost exactly offset reductions in the 
percentage of children who work without attending school. As changes in child schooling and 
work are only affected through changes in real consumption, the three cash transfer policies 
perform better than the food price subsidy. Of course, the aid-financed cash transfer with a 
budget of 1% of GDP has a greater impact. Although 1% of GDP in cash transfers represents 
a  significant  investment,  it  is  insufficient  to  offset  crisis  impacts  on  work  and  school 
decisions. Some complementary interventions on the supply side may be required, although 
this is beyond the scope of our analysis.  
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Table 21: Simulation of policy responses on education for children aged 6-10 
  S/NW  S/W  NS/W  NS/NW  school  work 
Base year (estimated)  54.209  28.679  10.685  6.425  82.888  39.364 
Crisis 2009  -0.045  -0.030  0.039  0.037  -0.076  0.008 
Crisis 2010  -0.161  -0.132  0.157  0.137  -0.294  0.025 
Crisis 2011  -0.175  -0.141  0.166  0.150  -0.316  0.025 
Food Subsidy 2009 (1% GDP)  -0.016  -0.004  0.008  0.012  -0.020  0.004 
Food Subsidy 2010 (1% GDP)  -0.134  -0.105  0.126  0.112  -0.239  0.021 
Food Subsidy 2011 (1% GDP)  -0.148  -0.116  0.138  0.126  -0.264  0.022 
Cash Transfer 2009 (1% GDP)  0.023  0.048  -0.040  -0.032  0.072  0.008 
Cash Transfer 2010 (1% GDP)  -0.095  -0.055  0.080  0.070  -0.149  0.025 
Cash Transfer 2011 (1% GDP)  -0.109  -0.066  0.091  0.084  -0.175  0.026 
Cash Transfer 2009+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.015  0.005  0.003  0.006  -0.010  0.009 
Cash Transfer 2010+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.131  -0.096  0.121  0.105  -0.226  0.025 
Cash Transfer 2011+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.144  -0.106  0.131  0.119  -0.250  0.026 
Cash Transfer 2009+PropertyTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.016  0.005  0.004  0.007  -0.011  0.009 
Cash Transfer 2010+PropertyTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.132  -0.097  0.123  0.107  -0.230  0.025 
Cash Transfer 2011+PropertyTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.146  -0.107  0.133  0.120  -0.253  0.026 
Source: Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
Note: S/NW=school and not work; S/W=school and work; NS/W=not school and work, NS/NW=not school and 
not work. 
Estimated rates for the base year are reported in % while values relative to the other scenarios are expressed as 
% point difference of the simulated values relative to the estimated "base" value 
 
Finally, although to a smaller extent, changes for each of the four different policy scenarios 
are  similar  for  children  aged  11  to  14  years  old  (table  22)  to  those  discussed  above  for 
younger children. These confirm that targeted cash transfers are more effective in increasing 
school participation than are food subsidies.  
Table 22: Simulation of policy responses on education for children aged 11-14 years 
  S/NW  S/W  NS/W  NS/NW  school  work 
Base year (estimated)  68.147  17.571  9.880  4.400  85.718  27.451 
Crisis 2009  -0.008  -0.034  0.019  0.022  -0.041  -0.014 
Crisis 2010  -0.029  -0.114  0.070  0.074  -0.144  -0.044 
Crisis 2011  -0.032  -0.123  0.075  0.080  -0.155  -0.049 
Food Subsidy 2009 (1% GDP)  -0.002  -0.013  0.006  0.009  -0.015  -0.007 
Food Subsidy 2010 (1% GDP)  -0.024  -0.095  0.057  0.061  -0.118  -0.037 
Food Subsidy 2011 (1% GDP)  -0.027  -0.104  0.062  0.069  -0.131  -0.042 
Cash Transfer 2009 (1% GDP)  0.009  0.007  -0.009  -0.007  0.016  -0.002 
Cash Transfer 2010 (1% GDP)  -0.013  -0.076  0.043  0.046  -0.088  -0.033 
Cash Transfer 2011 (1% GDP)  -0.016  -0.085  0.048  0.053  -0.101  -0.038 
Cash Transfer 2009+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.000  -0.016  0.007  0.010  -0.017  -0.009 
Cash Transfer 2010+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.022  -0.097  0.058  0.061  -0.119  -0.039 
Cash Transfer 2011+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.024  -0.106  0.062  0.068  -0.130  -0.044 
Cash Transfer 2009+PropertyTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.000  -0.017  0.007  0.010  -0.017  -0.010 
Cash Transfer 2010+PropertyTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.022  -0.098  0.058  0.062  -0.120  -0.040 
Cash Transfer 2011+PropertyTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.025  -0.107  0.063  0.069  -0.132  -0.044 
Source: Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
Note: S/NW=school and not work; S/W=school and work; NS/W=not school and work, NS/NW=not school and 
not work. 
Estimated rates for the base year are reported in % while values relative to the other scenarios are expressed as 




4.3.4 Access to health care for children under different policy responses 
The same policy responses are also simulated for their access on health care and the results 
are  presented  in  table  23.  Generally,  all  the  policy  responses  simulated  lead  to  some 
improvements in health access for ill children in comparison with the crisis scenario, but 
these  are  not  large  enough  to  return  to  base-year  levels.  In  terms  of  cost  effectiveness, 
allocating 1% of GDP to a targeted cash transfer produces marginally better outcomes than 
increasing real incomes by subsidizing food prices. While the crisis is simulated to decrease 
the percentage of sick children consulting any health facility by up to 0.56 percentage points 
in 2011, the cash transfer programme would only be able to increase this by around 0.1 
percentage points in 2011. 
 
The domestically-financed cash transfer programmes, with a budget of only 0.5% of GDP, 
have  slightly  less  than  half  the  impact,  regardless  of  the  domestic  tax  source,  as  the  tax 
increases lower real incomes whereas foreign aid does not. 
 
It is interesting to note that none of the policy responses simulated have a substantial effect 
on the choice of health facility. However they slightly counteract the substitution away from 
higher quality services. 
Table 23: Simulating policy responses on access to health care for sick children (0-14 




among all sick 
children 
 
Type health facility consulted among sick 
children who asked for health consultation 
Hospital  Clinic  Pharmacy  Other 
Base year (estimated)  61.034    29.908  32.462  32.083  5.546 
Crisis 2009  -0.172    -0.194  -0.098  0.277  0.015 
Crisis 2010  -0.493    -0.524  -0.283  0.766  0.041 
Crisis 2011  -0.563    -0.599  -0.296  0.852  0.043 
Food Subsidy 2009 (1% GDP)  -0.102    -0.126  -0.049  0.168  0.008 
Food Subsidy 2010 (1% GDP)  -0.423    -0.457  -0.242  0.664  0.035 
Food Subsidy 2011 (1% GDP)  -0.497    -0.535  -0.257  0.755  0.037 
Cash Transfer 2009 (1% GDP)  -0.079    -0.119  -0.066  0.176  0.009 
Cash Transfer 2010 (1% GDP)  -0.401    -0.450  -0.256  0.670  0.035 
Cash Transfer 2011 (1% GDP)  -0.473    -0.527  -0.270  0.759  0.038 
Cash Transfer 2009+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.138    -0.169  -0.090  0.246  0.013 
Cash Transfer 2010+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.456    -0.495  -0.274  0.731  0.039 
Cash Transfer 2011+ImportTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.526    -0.570  -0.287  0.817  0.041 
Cash Transfer 2009+PropertyTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.137    -0.168  -0.091  0.246  0.013 
Cash Transfer 2010+PropertyTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.458    -0.497  -0.276  0.735  0.039 
Cash Transfer 2011+PropertyTax (0.5% GDP)  -0.529    -0.573  -0.290  0.821  0.041 
Source: Authors’ elaborations using the results of the simulations 
Note: Estimated rates for the base year are reported in % while values relative to the other scenarios are 






4.  CONCLUSION 
In summary, the global crisis at the macro level is resulting in many shocks to the Ghanaian 
economy through fluctuating import prices, falling export demand, as well as reduced inflows 
of FDI, foreign aid and remittances. Simulations based on a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model suggest that these shocks lead to a significant slowdown in economic growth, 
especially in 2010 (3.8%, as opposed to 7.0% forecast in the absence of the crisis). Workers 
are pushed into the informal market where wage rates fall. At the same time, an early (2010) 
rebound in import prices and a forecast depreciation of the real exchange rate, contribute to a 
marked increase in consumer prices, whereas growth and employment levels only begin to 
recover in 2011. All these factors combine to significantly reduce household real incomes 
with negative effects on vulnerable members such as children. 
 
Before the crisis, in 2008, monetary poverty and hunger rates among children in Ghana were 
about 35 and 60%, respectively, with significant regional disparities particularly in terms of 
monetary  poverty.  Poverty  and  hunger  rates  are  especially  high  in  rural  households  and 
households with many children. 
 
When the wage, employment and price variations from our macro simulations are fed into 
micro (household- and individual-level) simulations, we predict that both monetary poverty 
and hunger would have reduced across all regions in Ghana from 2009 to 2011 without the 
financial crisis. Particularly strong reductions are forecast for rural areas – indeed, monetary 
poverty and hunger actually slightly increase in urban areas – and in households with many 
children.  
 
Results from the simulations indicate that the global crisis would increase monetary poverty 
and hunger  across all regions,  eroding many of the  gains made over the past few  years. 
Indeed, instead of a reduction of 4 percentage points in child monetary poverty in 2011, 
predicted in the absence of crisis, our simulations indicate a 6.6 percentage point increase 
compared with the year preceding the crisis, with a continuous increasing pattern over the 
period of study. The global crisis is also predicted to severely deepen hunger among children, 
which is simulated to increase up to 6.6 percentage points in 2011, beginning with a sharp 
already in 2009. For both monetary poverty and hunger large inter-regional variations emerge 
with  the  Eastern,  Volta  and  Greater  Accra  regions  predicted  to  be  the  most  affected. 
Households  with  few  children  and  in  urban  areas  are  more  severely  affected,  possibly 
because  rural  households  and  households  with  more  children  are  more  likely  to  be 
subsistence farmers and thus more insulated from market shocks. Similar trends are noted 
when the analysis is in terms of gaps rather than the incidence of poverty and hunger. Finally, 
the  increase  in  child  monetary  poverty,  primarily  driven  by  a  reduction  in  consumer 
purchasing power and a large drop in income in the non-agriculture sector, is partly offset by 
the  increase  in  agricultural  incomes  (from  the  value  of  both  sales  and  own-production) 
resulting  from  a  continuous  increase  in  food  prices.  Participation  in  schooling  and 
involvement in labour activities, as well as access to health services, among children are 
forecast  to  be  much  less  affected  by  the  crisis,  although  it  is  found  to  reverse  predicted 
increases in enrolment and health access (with substitution toward more modern types of 




In  summary,  our  analysis  of  alternative  policy  responses  suggests  that  they  significantly 
reduce monetary poverty and hunger,  yet have much more modest impacts on schooling, 
labour and health access among children. This is due to the fact that cash transfers and food 
subsidies  translate  directly  into  increased  real  income  and  food  consumption.  Indeed,  on 
average 57% of the expenditure of Ghanaians is on food. In contrast, real income is only one 
determinant of child labour, schooling and health access decisions. Supply-side policies (for 
example, investment in school infrastructures – namely, improving the quality of existing 
facilities and/or the construction of new facilities) may be much more effective here. In fact, 
over the past 2-3 years the government of Ghana has started to implement or design various 
health and education policies such as a school feeding programme, a capitation grant, health 
insurance, free maternal care and direct transfers to households. These have to some extent 
influenced social protection in the country especially in the area of health and education. 
 
This study simulated the effectiveness of 4 policy responses: (1) food price subsidies and (2) 
targeted cash transfer for poor children, both with a total budget of 1% of GDP in 2008 terms 
and  financed  through  external  aid;  targeted  cash  transfer  for  poor  children  using  a  total 
budget of 0.5% of GDP in 2008 terms domestically funded through (3) a 20% increase in 
tariffs  on  rice  imports  and  an  endogenous  increase  in  tariffs  on  non-food  manufacturing 
goods imports and (4) an endogenous increase in the property tax is also explored to finance 
the cash/in-kind transfer programme. 
 
A cash transfer programme targeted to poor children is found to be generally more effective 
in protecting children than food subsidies. Indeed, with a total budget equivalent to 1% of 
2008 GDP (Response 2), a cash transfer – equivalent to an individual annual amount of 19.8 
Cedis – would cut the predicted increase in monetary poverty by a third, over two percentage 
points, in 2011 or equivalent to around 200 thousand children.  
 
The impact of cash transfer on the hunger rate is smaller, at less than one percentage point 
(that  is  around  80  thousand  children  less  than  under  the  crisis  without  any  policy 
intervention), and is similar to those obtained with food subsidies: hunger is so deeply rooted 
that different and structural interventions would be required to truly improve the status of 
children. 
 
The four policies simulated generally cut the decline in schooling and increase in child labour 
resulting from the crisis, although not enough to totally offset them. In the same way, they 
slightly reduce the crisis-generated fall in health consultations and the substitution toward 
less modern types of health services.  
 
As the domestically funded policy responses – through taxes on specific imports or property 
taxation – do not have significant implications at the macro level, similar outcomes to those 
financed through external aid are predicted and the differences are mainly due to differences 
in the magnitude of the budget allocated to the policy (0.5% of GDP for the domestically 




Finally, although Ghana might be in a position to implement in a relatively short time a cash 
transfer  programme  to  respond  to  the  crisis  by  building  on  the  existing  Livelihood 
Empowerment against Poverty (LEAP) programme, other interventions (or mix of policies) 
might be more cost-effective in the short run. A combination of a universal or regionally 
targeted (starting with those regions where child poverty is more widespread) cash transfer 
programme for children aged 0 to 5 years old, together with a school-feeding programme in 
poorer regions, might represent an effective way to intervene quickly to improve child well-
being. With the same overall budget, a cash transfer provided universally to all children aged 
0 to 5 is estimated to lead to child monetary poverty rates that are substantially similar to the 
case in which a cash transfer is targeted to all children (0 to 14 years old) predicted as poor, 
while actually improving the situation of younger children. This result is basically due to the 
higher individual amount transferred under a universal approach (30.6 vs 19.8 Cedis) and the 
universal coverage of poor children. Under a targeted scheme, undercoverage always occurs 
to some extent, as children are identified as poor solely on the basis of a small number of 
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Annex I  
Table A: Commodity categories 
Commodity categories  Commodities  
1 Cereals   biscuits, millet, flour (wheat), bread-sugar bread, other 
cereals 
2 Maize  maize,  ground/corn  dough,  kenkey/banku  (without 
sauce) 
3 Tubers   cassava, cocoyam, other starchy staples 
4 Plantain  plantain 
5 Meat  beef,  pork,  bush  meat/wild  game,  goat  meat,  corned 
beef, other meat (dog, cat, etc.), mutton 
6 Poultry  poultry, chicken, other domestic  
7 Fruit   water melon, banana, orange/tangerine, coconut, other 
fruits not canned 
8 Vegetables  garden  eggs,  tomato  puree  (canned),  cocoyam  leaves 
(kontomire),  okro,  onions  (large/small),  tomatoes 
(fresh), other vegetables 
9 Fish   fish (smoked), fish (fried), fish (dried), fish (fresh and 
frozen),  crustaceans  (snails,  lobsters,  crabs,  prawns), 
fish (canned) other fish 
10 Pulses and Nuts   groundnuts  (roasted  or  raw),  palm  nuts,  beans,    other 
pulses and nuts  
11 Milk and milk products  sugar  (cube,  granulated),  tinned  milk  (unsweetened, 
evaporated),  milk  (powdered),  other  milk  products 
including cheese, other confectioneries 
12 Oils   palm oil, groundnut oil, sheaf butter, coconut oil, palm 
kernel oil, other vegetable oils including animal fats 
13 Rice  rice-imported, rice-local 
14 Eggs  chicken eggs other eggs 
15 Beverages  soft  drinks  and  minerals,  palm  wine/raffia  palm  wine 
etc,  Guinness  &  other  stout,  whiskies  and  gins,  other 
beverage  drinks,  akpeteshie,  beer  (local),  fruit  juices, 


















Table A: Results of the "proxy-means" regression to identify poor individuals in Ghana 
  Urban      Rural   
Regions         
Western  0.000     0.000  
Central  0.350 ***    0.363 *** 
Greater Accra  -0.066 *    0.000 *** 
Volta  0.301 ***    0.086 *** 
Eastern  0.188 ***    0.338 *** 
Astanti  0.345 ***    0.358 *** 
Brong Ahafo  0.305 ***    0.000  
Northern  0.000     -0.300 *** 
Upper East  0.000     -0.527 *** 
Upper West  -0.469 ***    -0.572 *** 
hh_ageabove14  -0.116 ***    -0.040 *** 
hh_agebelow15  -0.064 ***    -0.050 *** 
hh_size_2  0.000     0.000  
hh_size_3  -0.147 ***    0.000  
hh_size_4  -0.140 ***    0.000  
hh_size_5  -0.239 ***    0.000  
hh_size_6  -0.184 ***    0.000  
Education_hh_head  -0.256 ***    -0.129 *** 
Wall  0.207 ***    0.061 ** 
Roof  0.000     -0.069 *** 
Electricity  0.558 ***    0.049 ** 
Water  0.000     0.332 *** 
Kerosene  0.311 ***    0.000  
n_rooms  0.252 ***    0.585 *** 
Automobile  0.677 ***    0.000  
Moto  0.000     0.568 *** 
Constant  15.113 ***     15.148 *** 
"cut-off point”  12.504    12.504 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from GLSS 2005/06 
Notes:  
· Dependent variable: logarithm of total household expenditure (per adult equivalent) divided by the relevant 
regional price deflator  
· Econometric model: quantile regressions set at 0.174 for urban areas and at 0.30 for rural areas 
· Coefficients significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) level 
· Pseudo R
2 for “urban” 0.24; for “rural” 0.24 
· The “cut-off point” is in log form and corresponds to 3708900 old Ghana cedis, the 2005/6 poverty line 
· To  identify  the  poor,  it  is  sufficient  to  multiply  the  variables  for  each  household  by  their  respective 
coefficients. If the total sum is less than 15.126 the household is considered as poor. 
· In order to apply these estimated coefficients in the new monetary regime using the new Ghana cedis, it is 
sufficient to divide the poverty line by 10’000 to arrive at the new cut-off point in log terms (= 5.916) 
Key: 
Regions = binary variables for each region taking label “Western” (the comparison category) to “Upper West” 
hh_ageabove14 = number of household members aged 15 and over 
hh_agebelow15 = number of household members aged 14 and under  
hh_size = binary variables for number of household members. “hh_size_6” is for 6 or more 
education_hh_head = binary variable equal to 1 if household head had no education or only MSLC (urban) 
wall = binary variable equal to 1 if household lives in a house with a cement or sandcrete walls; 0 otherwise 
roof = binary variable equal to 1 if household lives in a house with a roof in leaves; 0 otherwise 
electricity = binary equal to 1 if household lives in a house with electricity; 0 otherwise 
water = binary equal to 1 if household has access to own source of water; 0 otherwise 
kerosene = binary equal to 1 if household uses kerosene as main source of lighting; 0 otherwise 
n_rooms = number of rooms per household member 
automobile = binary equal to 1 if household has an automobile; 0 otherwise 




Table B: Targeting performance (in per cent) for the child population (0-14 years old) 
  Predicted status 
Real status  Non poor  Poor 
  NATIONAL 
Non poor  62.9  37.1 
Poor  19.6   80.4 
  URBAN 
Non poor  60.9  39.1 
Poor  19.6  80.4 
  RURAL 
Non poor  64.2  35.8 
Poor  19.6  80.4 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on GLSS 5 
Notes: The model correctly predicts the real status of children when the actual and predicted statuses are the 
same (“non-poor/non-poor”; “poor/poor”). On the contrary, it fails when statuses do not coincide, resulting in 
either leakage (actual status is “non-poor” and predicted status is “poor”) or undercoverage (actual status is 
“poor” and predicted status is “non-poor”) 
 
Table C: Absolute numbers of children, total and by age groups 
    children 0-14  children 0-5  children 6-10  children 11-14 
Ghana    9,276,320  3,588,388  3,311,598  2,376,335 
Source: authors’ calculation based on GLSS5 and using sampling weights. The numbers take into account the 
child population growth between the year of the survey (2005/6) and the base-year of this study (2008) 
 
Annex III 
Table A: GDP growth rates under various scenarios (per cent) 
  BaU  Crisis  Response 1  Response 2  Response 3  Response 4 
2009  7.0  5.1  5.3  5.3  5.1  5.1 
2010  7.3  3.8  3.8  3.8  3.8  3.8 
2011  7.3  6.5  6.5  6.5  6.5  6.5 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on simulations 
 
Table B: Price effects under various scenarios (per cent) 
  BaU  Crisis  Response 1  Response 2  Response 3  Response 4 
Consumer prices   
2009  -2.3  4.2  2.5  3.6  4.2  4.2 
2010  -3.8  5.8  5.8  5.8  5.8  5.8 
2011  -3.9  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6 
Value added prices   
2009  4.2  0.8  1.7  1.3  1.0  0.8 
2010  5.5  -5.3  -5.2  -5.2  -5.2  -5.3 
2011  6.3  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7 







Table C: Wage and employment effects under various scenarios (per cent) 
  BaU  Crisis  Response 1  Response 2  Response 3  Response 4 
Formal work   
2009  3.1  2.0  2.3  2.3  2.1  2.3 
2010  4.1  -0.6  -0.6  -0.7  -0.5  -0.7 
2011  4.1  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.9  1.8 
Informal wage   
2009  10.8  6.7  8.2  7.5  7.0  6.8 
2010  13.4  -3.8  -3.7  -3.7  -3.7  -3.8 
2011  15.0  5.9  5.9  5.8  5.8  5.8 
Informal work    
2009  2.2  3.0  2.8  2.8  2.9  3.0 
2010  1.5  4.9  4.9  5.0  4.9  4.9 
2011  1.5  3.2  3.2  3.2  3.1  3.2 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on simulations 